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Abstract
Social science and economics research is often based on data collected in surveys. Due to time and budgetary
constraints, this data is often collected using complex sampling schemes designed to increase accuracy while
reducing the costs of data collection. A commonly held belief is that the sampling process affords the data subjects
some additional privacy. This intuition has been formalized in the differential privacy literature for simple random
sampling: a differentially private mechanism run on a simple random subsample of a population provides higher
privacy guarantees than when run on the entire population. In this work we initiate the study of the privacy
implications of more complicated sampling schemes including cluster sampling and stratified sampling. We find
that not only do these schemes often not amplify privacy, but that they can result in privacy degradation.
1 Introduction
In social science and economics research, surveying an entire population is typically infeasible due to time and
budgetary constraints. As a result, much of the data collected by statistical agencies is based on surveys performed
on a random sample of the target population. While the main motivation for sampling is often financial, a commonly
held belief is that sampling provides additional privacy. Intuitively, data subjects are afforded some plausible denia-
bility by the fact that they may, or may not, have been sampled. This intuition of increased privacy from sampling
has been formalized for some types of sampling schemes (such as simple random sampling with and without re-
placement or Poisson sampling) in a series of papers in the differential privacy literature [10, 14, 4, 13]. These types
of privacy amplification by sampling results are useful for a variety of reasons including producing more accurate
results at a target privacy level, and for providing additional incentive for participation in a survey study.
However, simple random sampling schemes like sampling with or without replacement and Poisson sampling
are rarely used in practice. Statistical agencies typically use more complex sampling designs to increase the accuracy
of the results and/or to reduce the costs of data collection. Unfortunately, these more complicated sampling schemes
can result in privacy degradation. That is, sampling can actually make privacy guarantees worse. It is often the case
that the design of a survey is based on sensitive historic or auxiliary data. Thus, the survey design itself can leak
additional information about the population. We find that this degradation of the privacy guarantee occurs even for
reasonably simple sampling designs when the sampling design is data dependent (see Lemma 2.1).
We focus on two common sampling schemes: cluster sampling and stratified sampling. We will discuss the
implication of these sample designs on the effective privacy loss, in terms of the ǫ parameter from differential
privacy. For stratified sampling, we will discuss how the data dependent nature of this sampling design results in
privacy degradation. We’ll then discuss a potential method for controlling the privacy loss for proportional sampling,
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a common sampling design for stratified sampling. For cluster sampling, we’ll discuss how the lack of independence
between the inclusion of different data subjects affects the privacy guarantee. We’ll show that even for relaxed
notions of privacy and “ideal” data, while the privacy does not degrade, privacy amplification is negligible.
1.1 Privacy Amplification by Sampling
Several works, e.g. [10, 14, 4, 13], have shown that by applying a differentially private data analysis to a random
sample of the population, rather than to the population itself, one can achieve an amplified privacy guarantee. That
is, the algorithm obtained by composing a differentially private algorithm with a random sampling process provides
a quantitatively better privacy protection than the original algorithm. These works have considered different notions
of privacy, e.g. bounded and unbounded differential privacy, and different sampling methods, e.g. Poisson sampling,
simple random sampling with replacement and without replacement. Balle et al. [2] gave a unified framework for
analyzing these privacy amplification effects via statistical divergences and probabilistic coupling between samples.
However, all of these works assume that the sampling mechanism is data independent, which is not often the case in
practical statistical surveys.
Let us now introduce some notation we will use in the remainder of the paper. Let U be a data universe. For
any n ∈ N, let Un be the set of all datasets of size n and U∗ = ∪n∈NUn. Let P ∈ U∗ be the population that is
sampled from. We will refer to x ∈ U as the data of a particular data subject. We’ll use |P | to denote the size of a
dataset. We will not distinguish between “historic” or “auxiliary” data and “current” data. That is, P will be both
the dataset used in designing the sampling scheme, and the dataset that is sampled from to get the final sample. This
is for ease of notation, as well as to highlight the fact that we will treat historic and auxiliary data as sensitive. In
future work, we would like to explore different models for the relationship between these datasets, for example by
modeling temporal correlation between historic and current data.
We will focus on unbounded differential privacy, also known as add/remove differential privacy, in this paper.
That is, the presence or removal of a data subject in the dataset is protected. This implies that the size of the dataset is
not fixed, and is considered a sensitive attribute. The specific technical results may be slightly different for bounded
differential privacy, where the size of the dataset is fixed and public, although we expect the general intuition to hold
for both notions. Given the privacy degradation results shown in this paper, it would be interesting to consider other,
possibly weaker, notions of privacy.
2 Privacy Degradation for Data Dependent Survey Design
It is often the case that the design of a survey is based on historic or auxiliary data. A common example is
stratified sampling, where characteristics of the target units are used to assign each data subject in the population
to a single stratum. Often knowledge about the within-stratum variability of the target variable is then used to
further improve the accuracy of the collected data. Nonresponse adjustment is another example, where response
rates from previous rounds of the survey are used to adjust the initial sampling rates for different subgroups of the
data to ensure that the final number of successful interviews matches the desired sample size. In addition to this
data dependence, many survey designs introduce dependencies between the inclusion of the different data subjects.
An extreme example is snow-ball sampling where data subjects are asked to recruit other data subjects to the study.
This phenomenon also occurs in simpler survey designs like cluster sampling. In survey sampling designs with these
properties, it is possible for the privacy guarantee to actually degrade.
Many common survey sampling designs result in privacy degradation. A simple, but important, example is
sampling without replacement when the number of samples is data-dependent. For a function f : U∗ → Z, let
GSf = max
P∈U∗,x∈U
|f(P )− f(P ∪ {x})|
be the global sensitivity of f .
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Lemma 2.1. Let f : U∗ → Z be a deterministic function and let F : U∗ → U∗×Z be defined by F (P ) = (P, f(P )).
Let CWOR : U∗×Z→ U∗ be the randomised sampling function that maps (P,m) to a dataset drawn from the uniform
distribution on {Z | Z ⊂ P, |Z| = m}. IfM is ǫ-DP thenM◦ CWOR ◦ F is (ǫ · GSf )-DP. Moreover, there exists
an ǫ-DP algorithmM such thatM◦ CWOR ◦ F is not ǫ′-DP for any ǫ′ < GSf ·ǫ.
The following is a simple example of a ǫ-DP mechanismM that suffers from the worst case privacy degradation.
Let f and CWOR be as in Lemma 2.1. Suppose thatM(Z) = |Z|+ Lap(1/ǫ), which provides an ǫ-DP estimate of
the size of the dataset. The resulting output ofM◦ CWOR ◦ F (P ) is f(P ) + Lap(1/ǫ). Then, a simple calculation
shows thatM◦ CWOR ◦ f does not satisfy ǫ′-DP for any ǫ′ < GSf ·ǫ.
In the following section, we will focus on stratified sampling, where we’ll see natural examples of functions
f with sensitivity higher than 1. We will see that this exact type of data dependence is present in one of the most
common stratified sampling schemes, proportional sampling. We will also suggest a slight alteration on these
common sampling schemes that will result in privacy amplification rather than privacy degradation.
3 Stratified Sampling
In stratified sampling, the population is partitioned into disjoint subsets, called strata. Random sampling is then
performed within each stratum. Stratified sampling is a method of variance reduction if the data collecting agency
expects the existence of mutually heterogenous but internally homogeneous subpopulations. It also ensures that each
stratum is represented in the final sample. An informative example is the IAB Job Vacancy Survey [3], a business
survey by the Institute for Emplyoment Research (IAB) in Germany that stratifies the population by industry, region,
and size of establishment. Other examples include stratification by race or gender. A crucial feature of this sampling
design is that the sampling rate may differ from stratum to stratum, and may be data dependent. We will consider
strata membership to be a sensitive attribute that is determined before sampling begins.
While the sampling within strata can be performed in a variety of ways, simple random sampling without re-
placement is often used for business surveys. Unfortunately, sampling without replacement falls exactly into the
type of data dependent sampling that was discussed in Lemma 2.1. Let f : U∗ → Zk be the function that computes
the number of cases that will be sampled per stratum. The global sensitivity of f is
GSf := max
P∈U∗,x∈U
‖f(P )− f(P ∪ {x})‖1,
the sum of the changes in each stratum. The following is an extension of Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 3.1. Let f : U∗ → Zk be a deterministic function. Let F : U∗ → U∗ × Zk be defined by F(P ) = (P, f(P ))
and C be the function that randomly samples a dataset of size f(P )i from stratum i for all i ∈ [k]. For any ǫ-DP
algorithm M, M ◦ C ◦ F is GSf ·ǫ-DP. Moreover, there exists a differentially private mechanism M such that
M◦ C ◦F is not ǫ′-DP for any ǫ′ < GSf ·ǫ.
As a concrete example, let us consider proportional sampling. Let S1, · · · , Sk be the strata so P = S1∪· · ·∪Sk.
In proportional sampling a total number of samples, n, is decided in advance. Then n· |Si||P | data subjects are randomly
sampled from stratum Si. Since n · |Si||P | can be fractional, one must determine a method of apportioning the samples.
If this process is not done carefully then privacy degradation can be significant, for example if deterministic rounding
is used, then f can be unstable and GSf can be as large as k.
An important feature of stratified sampling is that the parameters of the sampling design can vary between the
strata. This means that data subjects in strata with low sampling rates should expect a higher level of privacy than
data subjects in strata with high sampling rates. This leads us to a form of differential privacy that allows the privacy
guarantee to vary between the strata. Suppose there exist k strata, and that each data point is a pair (s, x) where
s ∈ [k] denotes which stratum the data subject belongs to, and x denotes their data.
Definition 3.2. Suppose there are k strata. A mechanism A satisfies (ǫ1, · · · , ǫk)-stratified differential privacy if for
all datasets P , data points (s, x), and sets of outcomes E,
e−ǫsP(A(P ) ∈ E) ≤ P(A(P∪{(s, x)}) ∈ E) ≤ eǫsP(A(P ) ∈ E)
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This definition is an adaptation of personalized differential privacy [9, 7, 1]. Notice that this definition protects
whether or not the data subject is included in the dataset. It also implies that the value of the data subject’s data is
also protected, although one has to pay for the privacy loss of the true stratum, and the privacy loss of the “fake”
stratum: for any dataset P , and data points (s, x) and (s′, x′), and any set of outcomes E,
P(A(P ∪ {(s, x)}) ∈ E) ≤ eǫs+ǫs′P(A(P ∪ {(s′, x′)}) ∈ E).
If the sampling method within each stratum is Poisson sampling, then not only does the privacy guarantee not
degrade; it actually improves! The following is an immediate consequence of the results for traditional differential
privacy [10, 14, 4, 13].
Lemma 3.3 (Privacy Amplification for Stratified Sampling with Poisson Sampling). Suppose there exist constants
r1, · · · , rk ∈ [0, 1] and let r : U∗ → U∗× [0, 1]k be the function r(P ) = (P, r1, · · · , rk). Let CP : U∗× [0, 1]k → U∗
be the sampling mechanism that maps (P, (r1, · · · , rk)) to subset where each data subject in stratum i is sampled
with probability ri. IfM is ǫ-DP thenM◦ CP ◦ r is (log(1 + r1(eǫ − 1)), · · · , log(1 + rk(eǫ − 1)))-stratified DP.
Note that when ǫ is small then
log(1 + ri(e
ǫ − 1)) ≈ riǫ,
so the privacy parameter is scaled by the probability of sampling any individual data subject. When ǫ is large,
log(1 + ri(e
ǫ − 1)) ≈ ǫ + log ri, which is slightly smaller than ǫ, so we don’t gain a significant advantage in this
regime.
3.1 Controlling privacy loss in stratified sampling
We discussed two results in the previous section: the sampling without replacement can results in privacy degra-
dation and Poisson sampling can result in privacy amplification. However, sampling without replacement is the
popular sampling method in practice for in-strata sampling. This method allows the data collecting agency to con-
trol the total sample size, an important property in practice due to budgetary constraints. In contrast, in Poisson
sampling, the number of samples follows a binomial distribution, and so it can be difficult to budget appropriately
for the number of samples. Thus, it is important to consider lightweight adaptations of these sampling schemes that
control privacy, while also allowing the analyst to upper bound the number of samples.
One option to control privacy loss in sampling without replacement is to use more stable apportionment meth-
ods. Apportionment methods like Huntington-Hill (the algorithm for senate seat apportionment used by the US
congress) produce more stable apportionment functions than deterministic rounding. Under some mild assumptions
the Huntington-Hill algorithm has global sensitivity at most 2. These methods do have computational overhead, in
particular because the number of samples in stratum i is a function of the sizes of all the strata, so the sample size
can not be computed on a stratum-by-stratum basis. We conjecture that a simpler algorithm, randomized rounding,
provides not only lower computational overhead, but actually results in privacy amplification for sampling without
replacement.
Conjecture 3.4 (Privacy Amplification for Stratified Sampling without Replacement). Let r : U∗ → [0, 1]k be the
constant function r(P ) = (r1, · · · , rk) for some constants r1, · · · , rk ∈ [0, 1]. Let CP : U∗ × [0, 1]k → U∗ be the
sampling mechanism that maps (P = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk, (r1, · · · , rk)) to a sample T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tk as follows. For each
i = 1, . . . , k, let pi = ri|Si| − ⌊ri|Si|⌋. Choose ni = ⌊ri|Si|⌋ with probability 1 − pi, and ni = ⌈ri|Si|⌉ with
probability pi. Let Ti be a random sample from Si of size ni.
IfM is ǫ-DP for ǫ < 1, thenM◦ CP ◦ r is (log(1 +O(ǫ)r1), · · · , log(1 +O(ǫ)rk))-stratified DP.
4 Clustered Sampling
In this section, we switch our attention to another feature of many survey sampling designs: dependencies
between the inclusion of different data subjects. That is, sampling schemes where the inclusion of data subject i is
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correlated with the inclusion of data subject j. We will focus on cluster sampling, a common survey sampling design.
In cluster sampling, the population is partitioned into disjoint subsets, called clusters. A fraction of the clusters are
chosen, and then random sampling is performed within the chosen clusters. This type of sampling scheme produces
accurate results when the clusters are mutually homogeneous yet internally heterogeneous. That is, when the
distributions within each cluster are similar to the distribution over the entire population. Cluster sampling is often
performed due to time or budgetary restrictions that make sampling many units from a few clusters cheaper and/or
faster than sampling a few units from each cluster. A typical example is when clusters are chosen to be geographic
regions where traveling between clusters is both time consuming and expensive. Note that this will typically result
in clusters that are internally homogeneous reducing the statistical efficiency compared to simple random sample.
This loss in efficiency is accepted to save costs.
We will assume that cluster membership is a sensitive attribute that is determined before sampling begins. There
are many sampling designs that analysts use to choose which clusters to sample from. We focus on a simple cluster
sampling design that might naively look like a good candidate for privacy amplification. We show that even under a
weaker notion of privacy (random differential privacy), this sampling design achieves less amplification than might
be expected. Note that more complicated cluster sampling designs may result in privacy degradation.
For a data subject i, let χi be a random variable that is 1 if i is sampled from P , and 0 if i is not sampled from
P . A crucial feature of a cluster sampling scheme, is that for two data subjects i and j, the random variables χi
and χj are correlated. For example, if two data subjects i and j belong in the same cluster, then the probability of
i being sampled conditioned on j being sampled is higher than the probability of i being sampled conditioned on
j not being sampled. While some level of dependence can be handled by the traditional amplification by sampling
results discussed in Section 1.1, e.g. sampling without replacement, these dependences are a lot milder than those
present in cluster sampling.
The traditional privacy amplification by subsampling results are often called “secrecy of the sample” since the
additional privacy is derived from the fact that whether or not any data subject is included in the sample is hidden.
This intuition fails us for cluster sampling, a few simple examples show that there is no general amplification result
for cluster sampling. To see this consider the following simple cluster sampling scheme: there are two clusters C1
and C2 so P = C1∪C2. A single cluster Ci is chosen uniformly at random and a ǫ-differentially private mechanism
M is performed on Ci. Let C be the sampling algorithm. Let C ′1 differ from C1 on a single data point. Then
P(M ◦ C(P ) = a)
P(M ◦ C(P ′) = a) =
1
2
P(M(C1) = a) +
1
2
P(M(C2) = a)
1
2
P(M(C ′1) = a) +
1
2
P(M(C2) = a)
(1)
Now we can see that if the distribution on outputs ofM(C1) andM(C2) is very different then we don’t expect
amplification (for intuition suppose P(M(C2) = a) = 0 and P(M(C1) = a) 6= 0). For a concrete example, suppose
M(Z) = |Z|+ Lap(1/ǫ) for some mechanismM with sensitivity 1. Suppose |C1| = 0 and |C2| = b and |C ′1| = 1
then the privacy guarantee ofM◦ C is
P(M◦ C(P ) = 0)
P(M◦ C(P ′) = 0) =
1 + e−ǫb
e−ǫ + e−ǫb
, (2)
which quickly approaches eǫ as b increases. Intuitively, the problem is that from the output, it is easy to guess which
cluster was chosen, so there is no secrecy of the sample.
Conversely, if the output distributions of M(C1) and M(C2) really are similar then equation 1 shows that
we do obtain amplification. For example if the distributions are identical then the privacy guarantee of M ◦ C is
log((1 + eǫ)/2) < ǫ. Unfortunately, in practice as pointed out above, we rarely have homogeneity between clusters.
Random differential privacy [8] gives a way to formalize the notion that we expect the datasets C1 and C2
to look similar. Given a distribution D over U , random differential privacy requires that the differential privacy
guarantee holds with high probability over neighbouring datasets P and P ′ drawn from D∗. Unfortunately, even
under this significantly weaker notion of the privacy guarantee and the strong assumption that both clusters are
drawn i.i.d. from the same distribution, we obtain negligible amplification. Suppose that the clusters are mutually
homogeneous such that each data point (in both clusters) xi is draw from the uniform distribution on {0, 1}. Let
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M(Z) = g(Z) + Lap(1/ǫ) where g(Z) = ∑|Z|i=1 zi, and |C1| = |C2| = n. Both g(C1) and g(C2) are drawn from
the Binomial distribution Bin(n, 1/2) which has variance 1
4
n. Therefore, we expect |g(C1) − g(C2)| ≈ 14
√
n with
constant probability. This results in a privacy guarantee of e
ǫ+e−
1
4
ǫ
√
n
1+e
− 1
4
ǫ
√
n
, which quickly approaches eǫ as n increases.
The problem again is that there is no secrecy of the sample since the noise due to privacy is smaller than the sampling
error.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Data-dependent sampling rates and correlations between individuals’ sampling events necessitate caution in
using the intuition that subsampling improves privacy in real sampling designs. Indeed, our negative results provide
scenarios where sampling degrades privacy.
We are working to extend our positive result for stratified sampling with Poisson sampling within each stratum
to sampling designs with non-constant sampling rates. In proportional sampling, the number of samples drawn from
each stratum i is proportional to the size of stratum i to ensure constant sampling rates in each stratum. A more
complex sampling design is the Neyman (or “optimal”) allocation which accounts for both the size of each stratum
and the variability of a statistic within each stratum to allocate a fixed number of samples in a fashion that minimizes
the total variance of the statistic.
Our predominant goal has been to analyse the privacy implications of sampling schemes as they are currently
deployed. However, we are also working to identify lightweight changes current sampling schemes that would result
in improved privacy guarantees. We are working to circumvent our lower bounds for sampling without replacement
when working with datasets for which f has lower local sensitivity than the worst case. Techniques such as the
propose-test-release framework [6] would let us privately verify that f has low local sensitivity and, in such cases,
give a guaranteed amplified privacy parameter. The downside to such an approach is that testing for non-worst-case
sensitivity requires changing the algorithm and consuming additional privacy budget.
As our ultimate objective is to understand what kinds of amplified privacy guarantees are afforded by real sam-
pling designs themselves, a more appealing option is to take a definitional perspective: Could there be a variant of
differential privacy (with similar semantics) that does enjoy amplification under data-dependent sampling without
replacement?
Finally, an additional challenge is to model sampling designs that involve complex-decision making. In particu-
lar, sampling designs where rates depend on human judgment or opaque analyses of past data releases are difficult
to encode when conducting an end-to-end privacy analysis.
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